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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN G. MATIEVITCH,
Appellant,
— vs.—

rCase No. 8281

HERCULES POWDER COMPANY,
a corporation,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

After due consideration of the pleadings, plaintiff's
deposition, affidavits filed by both parties, oral arguments and written briefs filed below, Judge Van Cott of
the Third Judicial District entered a Summary Judgment
dismissing plaintiff's action against the Hercules Powder
Company, respondent. Defendant was the manufacturer
of the dynamite and blasting caps, the explosion of which
had injured plaintiff.
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There was no dispute below as to the evidence.
Plaintiff concedes in his briefs "that there is no direct
evidence to show how the defendant was negligent in the
manufacture of the caps and dynamite." The sole issue
below, which is the genuine issue here on appeal, is the
legal question of whether on the basis of plaintiff's own
statement of the evidence in this particular case, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be invoked to permit
inference of defendant's negligence, and so take the case
to the jury.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the particular facts determine whether as a
matter of law the specific occurrance will itself bespeak
of negligence, a more detailed reference to the record
before the court below than was presented by appellant's
brief is deemed essential. In so stating these facts it is
to be remembered that the basic question on appeal is
the District Court's decision that these facts, favorably
construed for plaintiff and absent any genuine issue
with respect thereto, as a matter of law required the
equivalent of a directed verdict for defendant or the sustaining of a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint if such
facts had been properly pleaded, under the old practice.
What, then, are these facts ?
1. Defendant's manager, L. W. Early, made affidavit
as follows (R. 10-11) :
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3. That said defendant company for many
years has and now is engaged in the business of
manufacturing explosives, including dynamite and
blasting caps. That the dangerous nature of dynamite and particularly of blasting caps is well
known. That such products are packed by the defendant in containers marked with warning signs
of the dangerous nature of the product. That in
each case of dynamite and blasting caps as manufactured and produced by defendant, written
warnings and instructions as to use are inserted,
a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference is made a part hereof.
4. That such products are sold wholesale by
defendant to jobbers or distributors, and in some
instances are sold direct to major consumers of
such dynamite and blasting caps. That for many
years defendant has known that its dynamite and
blasting caps had been used by the Portland Cement Company, operator of the Le Grande Quarry
in Parley's Canyon, Utah.
5. That said Portland Cement Company was
the employer of plaintiff, who was injured at said
quarry on the 9th day of January, 1951. That
at times said Portland Cement Company has purchased and used the dynamite and blasting caps
of manufacturers other than defendant, together
with fuses purchased from others. That defendant does not manufacture or sell the fuse which
is used to ignite the blasting caps. That the use
of dynamite, blasting caps and fuse and the operation and control of the said Le Grande Quarry
at all times has been and is under the exclusive
direction of said Portland Cement Company as
owner and operator thereof.
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6. That the inherent nature of blasting caps
is such that they will readily detonate or explode
unless at all times carefully handled and protected
from heat, shock, pressure or contact with rock,
metal or other hard substances.
2. Plaintiff's fellow-employee, W. W. Harwood,
made affidavit that he knew that the caps and powder
being used by plaintiff on the day of the accident (January 9, 1951) were of defendant's manufacture, having
been so marked on the containers in the Portland Cement
Company's powder house from which the particular caps
and powder were removed by plaintiff for use on that
day (paragraphs 7 and 10, K. 16).

3. There is no dispute as to these facts; or as to
the accident itself. We quote from plaintiff's own deposition, plaintiff being the sole witness as to these facts
(deposition pages 1 to 19, R. 24 to 42):
"JOHN G. MATIEVITCH, plaintiff herein,
called as a witness at the instance and request of
the defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as
follows:

Q. What year, or about when did you become
employed by the Utah Portland Cement Company?
A. Well, sir, it was 1936.

4
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Q. Now, John, can you describe briefly what
your work on the powder would be, in terms that
some of us who are not in that work can understand? What would you do?
A. How I had to do it?
Q. Yes. What were your duties ?
A. I was a powderman, loading holes.
Q. Can you describe the holes ?
A. Well, the drill men drill the holes; then
we powdermen load them. Do you want to know
how they are loaded?
Q. You wouldn't drill the holes, is that it!
A. One day I would be powderman and two
days a drillman; wTe changed; there were three of
us up there.
Q. There were three on the crew, is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Approximately what are the dimensions
of those holes?
A. They varied.
Q. They vary in depth you mean ?
A. Yes; some would be different.
5
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Q. Are they drilled by a pneumatic type of
drill, or what kind of drill do you use ?
A. What we had been using there? All different types of drills up there, 18 inch and there
was a three-footer. It depends on the boulder;
you have to use your own judgment.
Q. You were drilling boulders that had been
blasted from the face of the quarry?
A. Yes, the bottom would be covered up; the
shovel would dig some of them out and put them
on the side for us to drill.
Q. Those are large boulders that had been
blasted from the face of the quarry, is that right?
A. Yes; they vary, them boulders.
Q. They are large boulders that have been
blasted from the face ?
A. Yes, that has been blasted.
Q. Then they have to be broken up, is that
right?
A. If they are too big for the crusher.
Q. Is that called secondary blasting?
A. I guess so, yes.
Q. You and your fellow employes would drill
the holes and then put in the powder, is that correct?
A. There would be two drills; one day the
powderman would be doing the loading; the drillmen wouldn't be doing nothing but just do their
drilling.

6
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Q. The depth of those holes would depend on
the particular boulder, is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Then after the drilling then the charge is
put in, is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. By the powderman?
A. Yes sir.
Q. How would that be done! Would you
describe that?
A. Well, we would fold the blasting cap. (indicating)
Q. Like a fishhook!
A. Yes, until we fold it over, (indicating)
Q. This end? (indicating)
A. Yes, that is, of the blasting cap; then put
it in the drill hole.
Q. Then would you put the powder on top of
it?
A. You would slit the powder down the side
and put it in.
Q. On top of the fuse and the cap?
A. Yes.

7
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Q. Then what is the next step in the operation, tamp it?
A. Yes, tamp it.
Q. As I understand, the fuse is kind of stiff
like an electric wire, isn't it?
A. It is stiff.
Q. And a black covered material?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And on the end of that you fasten — it is
a copper cap, isn't it?
A. Yes sir.
Q. That is the blasting cap?
A. That is the blasting cap that you crimp
on the end of it.
Q. Then you would hook the cap around like
a fishhook on the end?
A. Just bend it over like a hook.
Q. Then insert the cap on the bent end down
to the bottom of the drill hole, is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Now, the powder comes in cartridges,
doesn't it? What do you call the powder charge?
A. That comes in sticks.
8
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Q. You call it a stick?
A. A stick.
Q. Those are about how long?
A. I would say approximately around eight
inches.
Q. The diameter is smaller than the hole so
it will fit down in the hole, is that right ?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did I infer you to say you would gouge
out the sides so it would fit around the fuse, is
that it?
A. What do you mean by "gouge out the
sides"?
Q. I don't know; you were telling me as I
understood you —
A. I split it and put it in the hole.
Q. When you split it how would that be done?
A. Just slitting each side of it — the stick
of powder.
Q. You mean you would break it in two like
a pencil?
A. No; slit it down.
Q. What with?
A. A pocket knife.
9
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Q. What would the purpose of that be?
A. So if you tamp it it tamps better.
Q. It loosens it up?
A. Loosens it up so when you put it in there
you don't force it or anything.
Q. Then do you tamp it?
A. Yes, tamp it.
Q. How is that done ?
A. With a tamping stick.
Q. Is that a wooden stick?
A. Yes sir.
Q. That fits down in the hole; and what does
it do, enable you to apply pressure?
A. You don't put much pressure, just a little
bit down in there.
Q. To firm it up?
A. To firm it.
Q. You pack it solid, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Then I guess you light the fuse and get
out of there, is that it?
A. You have to get out.
10
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Q. Now, on January 9, of 1951, you were
working in the quarry, were you not.
A. Yes sir.
# # •

Q. Shortly before the time of the accident do
you recall what you were doing?
A. A short time before the accident?
Q. Yes.
A. I was getting my stuff ready to load,
getting my primers and powder and all that.
Q. You were getting ready to blast one of
these boulders, is that it ?
A. Well, we get quite a few of them loaded.
Q. Then you send them off at the same time,
is that it?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Then will you just tell us in your own
words, as far as you can remember, just what
happened?
A. Well, I put my blasting cap—like I told
you—folded it, slit my powder down the sides,
and put it in the hole; just as I put it in the hole,
that's all I could tell; it just exploded.
Q. Was that a full stick of dynamite ?
A. It was a full stick.
11
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Q. You had put it in the hole after slitting
it — do you slit it ?
A. Yes, just down the sides.
Q. You were tamping it ?
A. No sir.
Q. How deep was that particular hole?
A. That was approximately around between
8 and 12 inches.
Q. Can you remember anything else that
happened in connection with the accident?
A. Just that I put it in that way; it just surprised me.
Q. Had you drilled the hole?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember who drilled the hole?
A. It was one of the drillmen.
Q. Who were the drillmen ?
A. Harold Buchanan and Bill Harwood.
Q. They had drilled it and gotten it ready
for you, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You inserted the cap and the fuse, is that
right?
A. Yes.
12
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Q. Did there appear to be anything unusual
with respect to either the cap or fuse in appearance?
A. No sir.
Q. And then you slit with a knife the stick
of dynamite!
A. Yes.
Q. Did it appear to be normal, as far as you
could observe?
A. As far as I could observe it was normal.
Q. Then you put the stick into the hole, is
that right?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Are these holes vertical or horizontal!
A. Well, we just drill them straight down.
Q. Just drill them straight down?
A. Yes sir, straight down; just the way your
boulders would lay too.
Q. Would it be fair to say in this case yon
dropped the stick down in the hole?
A. No; I put it in there; I didn't drop it;
I just put it in.
Q. You inserted it!
A. Yes.
13
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Q. And then it would drop by gravity I guess
the balance of the way, wouldn't it, to the bottom?
A. When you put it in there it just goes down
itself.
Q. You recall distinctly that you didn't tamp
it, is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And the explosion occurred right after you
had let go of the stick?
A. Just when I put it in and let go; just a
big explosion. I have never seen from that day
on.
Q. Mr. Matievitch, which hand do you use
to put a stick of dynamite in one of these holes?
A. Use my left hand.
Q. Is the right hand holding the fuse ?
A. Put it in with your left hand; you use
both hands at times.
Q. Is one hand usually holding the fuse in
place and the other is inserting the dynamite, is
that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there a possibility that as you were
inserting the dynamite you were pulling on the
fuse with your other hand ?
A. No; when you put your fuse in you don't
mess around with the fuse; you just put the fuse
in, then your dynamite.
14
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Q. You hold that steady, is that it?
A. Yes, you pick up the end of the fuse and
split the end of it when it is loaded.
Q. I am afraid I don't understand that; I
can see how you insert the cap on the end of the
fuse, and you are holding it in place, is that right,
in the hole?
A. Just fold it and put it in your drill hole, the cap.
Q. Then with your left hand you insert the
stick of dynamite?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, are you sure this was a full stick?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Sometimes you break the stick into a
quarter or half, don't you?
A. Yes, it varies in different sizes of your
boulders; you can tell by that; it varies in different sizes of boulders; some take a half stick,
some a stick; some less than half.
Q. It is your best recollection this was a
full stick in this case, is that right?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you inserted that with your left hand
in the hole, is that right?
A. Inserted the powder, yes.
15
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Q. Then, as I understand it, as you let go of
the stick of dynamite, the explosion occurred!
A, Yes sir.
Q. Of course, Mr. Matievitch, after an explosion, including this explosion, would there be
anything left of the cap or explosive or fuse?
A. Oh no.
Q. Those materials are just completely disintegrated, is that right?
A. Disintegrated with the blast I guess.
Q. Mr. Matievitch, where did you learn how
to handle powder and to insert these charges in
the drill holes?
A. That was when I went up there to work,
up to the quarry; the powder man up there that
was on—I was taught.
Q. By your fellow employes?
A. By my fellow employes.
Q. Again, who was in charge of the operation?
A. He is gone; he is Up Above; he died.
Q. What was his name?
A. Bob Rukovina — you mean in charge of
us?
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. Yes.
A. He knew more about it than any of us at
that time.
Q. Was he around there at that time?
A. No, he passed away.
Q. But he is the man more than any other
who instructed you as to how to work with
powder ?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that the safe
way to load such a charge was to insert the cap
in the top of the stick of dynamite and then to
insert the stick of dynamite into the hole ?
A. No sir, nobody ever told me that; just
what I was taught up there from their other
powdermen.
Q. So far as you know the standard way of
blasting these boulders was to first insert the cap
on the fishhook of the fuse and then the powder,
is that right?
A. Yes sir, put your powder in.
Q. Then you tamp, is that right!
A. Yes.
THE WITNESS: Sometimes I don't get you,
what you say. You will have to excuse me.
MR. BEHLE: I appreciate that. That is
why I want you to feel free to add anything here
to the story because we are just trying to find
out what happened.
17
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Q. Have you any idea as to what caused this
explosion?
A. Just by putting my powder in, and that
explosion; that's all I could say on it.
Q. You knew, of course, that explosives are
inherently dangerous? I mean they have to be
handled carefully; you knew that ?
A. Oh yes.
Q. And you don't know of anything on this
day that you did that was out of the ordinary?
A. No sir.
Q. In your experience out there had there
ever been another unexpected explosion ?
A. Well, not the way I had it.
Q. Who had charge of the explosives — the
supply?
A. Well, that was left to us; we had the keys,
—the powdermen.
Q. You had the keys to the powder room?
A. Yes.
Q. These sticks of dynamite come in cases,
don't they?
A. Yes, cases.
Q. Would you unpack those cases?
A. When we go to use the dynamite we would
unpack them.
18
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Q. Each case has a set of instructions in it,
has it not?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did you ever read those instructions!
A. Yes sir.
Q. But, again, no one ever told you that it
was a dangerous practice to drop the dynamite
on top of the fishhook fuse and cap!
A. No sir.
Q. In the years of working up there you
never followed the practice of inserting the cap
in the stick of dynamite and fastening it on and
then putting the stick of dynamite in the hole ?
A. Well, they laced powder up there when
the holes are a lot deeper, where you have to go
quite a ways down, they have always laced that
way.
Q. But not in your blasting of these boulders!
A. No, they wouldn't do it that way. Sometimes the holes varied; some are deeper you know.
Q. On some of the deeper holes you have
laced the powder!
A. That was when you had the long holes, as
if you were shooting underground and had three
or four feet—(then you) have to lace the powder;
couldn't force the cap in a hole like that. We
never do force caps anyway, though.
19
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Q. Then, again, the way you have described
is the way during all these years you inserted the
powder charge into the drill holes of these
boulders ?
A. That is how they done it all the time when
they were drilling boulders; that is how they
loaded.
Q. Are you working now?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you tell me how old you were ? I think
you said thirty-nine.
A. Thirty-nine.
Q. Married?
A. No sir.
MK. BEHLE: Do you have any questions?
MR. RICH: I have no questions.
MR. BEHLE:
Q. Anything more you want to say Mr.
Matievitch?
A. That is all I could say.
Q. That tells the story fairly and completely,
as best you know ?
A. To the best of my knowledge.
MR. BEHLE: Thanks very much, as we appreciate your coming up here.

20
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(Off the record)
MB. BEHLE:
Q. At the time of the explosion do yon recall
where your tamping stick was ?
A. No, I couldn't tell you that.
Q. I thought you said while we were off the
record that it was under your left arm.
A. You said after the explosion?
Q. I say at the time of the explosion.
A. It was under my left arm.
Q. Under your left arm?
A. Yes. I thought you meant after the explosion.
Q. So you are sure that you were not tamping
at the time of the explosion ?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Tamping would have been the next step,
is that right?
A. Yes, that would have been the next step
after putting the powder in.
Q. Then do you use sand to hold the fuse in
place, or just tamp?
A. Just tamp.
Q. These fuses are not electrically operated,
are they?
A. No sir.
21
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Q. Do you use a match!
A. Yes, we have a spitter.
Q. That sets of f a series I
A. Yes; that keeps spitting your fire out and
you touch your ends to it.
Q. Where was Mr. Harwood at the time of
the explosion, do you recall?
A. He was there drilling.
Q. Was he one of your crew?
A. He was one of the crew, yes sir.
Q. How big was the boulder, do you recall?
A. I would say approximately between 400
and 500 pounds.
Q. How high would that stand?
A. I couldn't recall how high it stands.
Q. Well about? Would that be the height of
a man?
A. Well, that was over there with them
others; I couldn't tell how high it would stand.
Q. Would you have to get up on top of it?
A. No, I didn't get on top of it.
Q. Again, you state that it was a full stick?
A. Yes sir.

22
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Q. And that you had not tamped!
A. No sir.
4. The foregoing deposition of plaintiff thus reveals
his failure to follow the manufacturer's instruction as to
use of the inherently dangerous product. These instructions stated (reference is also made to the illustrations)
as follows (B. 13):
PBIMING: When blasting caps are used, the
proper length of fuse should be cut from the roll
and the blasting cap crimped to the fresh cut end
of the fuse with a cap crimper, not with a knife
or with the teeth. Be sure that the fuse is cut
square across and that the end is pushed gently
against the explosive material in the blasting cap.
Do not twist the fuse inside the cap. The crimp
in the blasting cap should be made near the end
through which the fuse enters. In wet work, the
joint between the fuse and cap should be made
thoroughly waterproof.
Punch a hole about the size of a lead pencil
either in the end or side of the cartridge, this hole
to be a little deeper than the length of the blasting cap. Insert the blasting cap and fasten the
fuse securely to the dynamite cartridge to prevent
the cap and fuse being pulled out of the dynamite
cartridge. Aim to keep the blasting cap axially in
the center of the cartridge. See Figs. 1 and 2.
(Illustrations omitted)
II.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. There was no genuine issue of material fact in
this case.
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2. Res ipsa loquitur does not here apply.

3. Plaintiff was not denied opportunity to present his
contentions below.

ARGUMENT
1. There was no genuine issue of material fact in
this case.
While the cause of plaintiff's accident remains in
question, it will be seen from the statement of the record
below that the basic facts with respect to what had occurred were simply not in dispute. The real issue below,
as well as here, was one of law as applied to these undisputed facts.

By this action plaintiff undertook the burden of
proof to establish that the defendant was negligent in
some respect in connection with the manufacture of a
particular one of the hundreds of thousands of blasting
caps or dynamite sticks which defendant has produced
at its various plants. These caps, packed in bulk with
instructions as to use, as well as the dynamite, are distributed throughout the world through wholesale and
retail outlets, and far beyond defendant's control.

24
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To meet this burden of proof and in the admitted
absence of any evidence, plaintiff in effect urges this
court to promulgate a rule of law that in the event of any
explosion, the manufacturer of any of the components
contributing to the explosion must permit a jury to
speculate as to the cause of the accident. This of course
is not the law of negligence, but is a doctrine of absolute
manufacturer's liability for all practical purposes.

a. In addition to urging this rule of law, discussed
hereinafter, plaintiff would support his case by permitting an expression of raw opinion by an alleged "expert"
as to cause.

Attention is invited to the details of Rudelich's gratuitous conclusion as an old powderman that this particular accident, occurring in a hazardous occupation where
any number of factors may have caused the accident,
was due to faulty manufacture. A reading of this affidavit (R. 20 to 22) discloses not only the incompetence of
the powderman to express an opinion as to manufacture,
but that its use is simply fantastic as a substitute for
competent factual evidence of negligent manufacture.
We are even left to speculate as to whether the negligent
manufacture was as to the blasting cap, or as to the dynamite.

The affidavit is the equivalent of plaintiff's in a
motor vehicle case expressing his raw personal opinion
that he was not negligent, but that the defendant was.
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Of course these are the very matters which the trier of
the facts is to determine, assuming competent evidence
raises a dispute of fact which requires determination.

It will be noted that Rudelich's affidavit avers nothing whatsoever with respect to any "special knowledge,
skill, experience or training" in the manufacture of explosives, as required by Rule 402 of the Model Code of
Evidence. This rule merely re-states the well settled law;
and since the fact at issue was defendant's alleged negligence in the manufacture of its products, the rejection
by the lower court of this affidavit was obviously understandable. Rule 56 (e) requires such affidavits to "set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence", and
also establish that affiant was "competent to testify to
the matters stated therein." Accordingly, the conclusions
of such affidavit, although under oath, are worth no more
than the bare assertion by counsel in the complaint,
under his professional certificate, that the explosion was
due to defendant's negligence. Neither per se is the
equivalent of the evidence necessary to support such a
charge; and the burden of establishing these charges by
competent evidence rests upon plaintiff, not defendant.
b. Nor can an issue raised in the pleadings be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for the purposes of
the summary judgment procedure, when the evidence is
set forth under oath in competent affidavit or deposition
form. Plaintiff's contention (page 8) that an issue in
the pleadings per se constitutes a genuine issue would

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of course destroy the efficacy of motions under Rule 56
and defeat the purpose of the procedure. Engl v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 139 F . 2d 469, 473; Rule 56, note subdivision
(e) page 50, May 8, 1954 Report of Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the
United States.

If there is a genuine issue of fact, admittedly the
motion for summary judgment should be denied. Young
v. Pelornia,
Utah
, 244 P. 2d 862; although
the order pursuant to section (d) of Rule 56 should proceed to cover appropriate pretrial matters.

c. Nor, as plaintiff contends (page 9), are theories
the equivalent of the competent evidence necessary to
create genuine fact issues. Plaintiff is still free to present and argue whatever theories were proper below
under the facts. His trouble is the absence of facts to
support his averment, first, that defendant negligently
manufactured a product, and secondly, that this negligence in manufacture was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Of course if such negligence and causation
are proved, there would be liability under the rules quoted
by plaintiff from the Restatement in 2 Torts A.L.I. § §
388 et seq.

In this connection it might be well to reiterate that
negligence in manufacture is here the basis of plaintiff's
cause of action. I t is not breach of warranty, as in Park
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v. Moorman, or negligence in warning as to use, which
was the cause of action in the Hopkins case and in other
cases relied upon in plaintiff's brief.

Counsel appears to misconstrue or misunderstand
the function of the summary judgment procedure, which
is designed for situations such as this where competent
evidence as to the material facts is either lacking, or is
not in dispute. In either case, there remains nothing for
the trier of facts to determine, since there is no issue as
to the material facts. With the expedition afforded by
the summary judgment procedure, the legal questions
can be determined without the delay, expense and inconvenience otherwise resulting in calling the case for
trial, impaneling a jury, permitting witnesses such as
plaintiff to testify, and then determining the matter on
a proper motion for a directed verdict.
I

• .

The genuine issue in this case still remains the legal
one of whether or not res ipsa loquitur could be invoked
as a rule of law under the undisputed facts of this accident. If so, admittedly a jury question would be presented; if not, the summary judgment was proper, for
otherwise no genuine issue of fact was in this case.

I
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2. Res ipsa loquitur does not here apply.
No one here questions the propriety of the court's
extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to factsituations of a modern world. This is the strength of the
common law.
a. One may not under certain conditions expect a
properly manufactured and installed water pipe to burst,
a new tire to explode upon inflation, or a bottle of beverage to explode, without the probability of negligence on
the part of the manufacturer or producer, any more than
we would expect electricity to cause damage to a pedestrian or a street lamp to fall upon him, etc., etc., without
the probability of negligence on the part of the persons
in control of these various instrumentalities.
Throughout all such fact-situations, and as said by
courts and text writers everywhere, for the occurrence
itself to bespeak of negligence on the part of those in
control, the accident must be the kind that ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of negligence; and the accident
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality still
within the exclusive practical control of the party charged
with negligence. The basis of the doctrine and quotations
from cases and the texts with respect to its application
to a particular case have been reiterated time and time
again by this court; e.g., Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P 2d 660.
In sharp contrast to fact-situations where the doctrine has been applied as a matter of law to raise an
inference of negligence, is the situation pertaining to the
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blasting cap. In its very nature it is inherently explosive;
its use is not in the control of the manufacturer. News
stories over the years unfortunately have been and still
are replete with reports of boys injured while trespassing
and playing with caps, and of accidents from explosives
to workmen such as plaintiff. The reported causes are
almost invariably carelessness on the p a r t of persons
handling these sensitive caps, rather than negligence in
their production. The instrumentalities exploded, just
as they were designed to do.

Society's remedy—admittedly as inadequate in one
sense to the injured as are monetary damages in any
personal injury case, is the coverage apart from negligence of workmen's compensation laws, plus safety laws
and inspections to prevent such tragedies as occurred to
plaintiff in the course of his employment.

b. Here the record is silent concerning not only the
manufacture of this particular cap and dynamite by defendant, but also as to the progress of these products
from the point of manufacture and packing in cases and
boxes with instructions. We pick up the trail long after,
when plaintiff is reported to have selected the particular
cap and dynamite stick from the powderhouse of the
employer.
We do know that plaintiff alone was in control of
the operation. I t was plaintiff who placed the blasting
materials in the particular drill hole. Also we know that
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unfortunately the plaintiff was not following the manufacturer's explicit instructions as to priming the charge.
His method of loading reminds one of another old hardrock miner's practice: crimping the blasting cap onto the
fuses with his teeth. The reasons for abandonment of
both practices—tooth-crimping, and dropping the dynamite stick down the drill hole on top of the previously
inserted cap and fuse—are the same: sad experience
with the older and more primitive methods simply resulted in too many accidents of the very type which occurred in this case.
It matters not that in plaintiff's opinion (R. 38) or
in the instructions of his old-time teacher Rukovina (Ii.
37) or that in the opinion of "expert" Rudelich (E. 21),
the practice of first inserting the cap on its fishhook fuse
could be done without causing an explosion. Experience
had demonstrated—at least to others—that to permit
contact of the sensitive detonator against the hard-rock
substances of the drill holes might and probably here did
cause an accident.

If anything, the fact-situation which we have in this
case bespeaks of plaintiff's own negligence as the person
in control, carelessly failing to follow instruction issued
by the manufacturer as to the particular products; and
not that defendant was negligent in the manufacture
of a product which exploded in the course of the very
work for which the product was designed, and in a manner of use for which warning was given.
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c> That res ipsa loquitur does not apply to factsituations pertaining to explosion of dynamite caps in
cases comparable to plaintiff's, are the following:
35 C.J.S. § 11—EXPLOSIVES:

The mere explosion of dynamite caps carries with it no presumption of negligence on the
part of the manufacturer or seller, and the injured
person has the burden of proving that the manufacturer or seller was guilty of the negligence
charged, particularly where such explosive is not
under the exclusive control of defendant. Similarly, in an action against the manufacturer of
a powder fuse for injuries resulting to a purchaser
from a delayed explosion, plaintiff has the burden of proving defendant's negligence. However,
in a minor plaintiff's action based on defendant's
unlawful sale of a torpedo to him, he is not required to prove that the torpedo contained a dangerous and explosive substance, within the statute.
See also 22 Am. Jur., Explosions and Explosives, §§ 73
and 95.

Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118
F . 2d 531, was a dynamite cap case where the explosion
occurred upon crimping. There the United States Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court below, which, refused to apply res ipsa loquitur in the following words:
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•• * * Here, the defendant was not in control
of the instrumentality which inflicted the injury.
The custody and manner of using the cap was in
the exclusive control of the plaintiff. While the
defendant's manufacture of the cap was admitted,
what the circumstances of its storage and care
had been from the time it left the defendant's possession until the plaintiff's employer purchased it
was not traced. Proof of manufacture was not
sufficient to impute continued control to the defendant. See Zahniser et al v. Pennsvlvania Torpedo Co., Ltd., 190 Pa, 350, 353, 42 A. 707. In
fact, the plaintiff's proof did not exclude the
possibility of intervening fault (occurring between
the time the Magnesia Company received the cap
and the time the plaintiff took it from the storage
magazine for use) for which the defendant would
not be responsible. What the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania said in Eucinski v. Colin, 297 Pa.
105, 115, 146 A. 445, 448, where the defendant was
out of control of the instrumentality, is apposite
here, "it would extend the rule of responsibility
to unwarranted lengths and make it virtually that
of res ipsa loquitur to sustain a recovery under
the facts as here shown."

It will be remembered that plaintiff's failure to
follow the manufacturer's instructions as to method of
priming might here speculatively have been the cause of
the accident. The Sierocinski case above is also pertinent
in this connection, the court saying:
But even if the evidence warranted a finding
that the defendant's original control had been
unbroken down to the time of the accident, neither
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the rule of res ipsa loquitur nor the doctrine of
exclusive control was available to the plaintiff.
There is evidence in the plaintiff's case from
which it could be reasonably inferred that the accident happened in a manner for which the defendant was not blameable. One of the plaintiff's
witnesses, who was 50 to 75 feet from the scene at
the time of the accident, testified that there were
two explosions. Another witness, who came to
the scene immediately after the accident, testified
to finding the crimpers undamaged lying on the
top of the "Day magazine" and also some cut
fuses; that he found three fuses with exploded
caps and a like number with unexploded caps
hanging on nearby bushes; that physical evidences
of the explosion were found on the ground 9 feet
from the " d a y magazine"; and that the plaintiff
had then said that he had had seven or eight fuse
caps in his hand just prior to the accident. The
plaintiff himself testified that the great toe of
his left foot was blown off although protected
by a heavy working shoe and that he also suffered
injuries to his legs, chest, arms, throat and face.
In these circumstances, an inference that the accident was precipitated by the plaintiff's stepping
upon a cap while bending over to recover some
dropped caps wrould not have been unreasonable.
The matter for consideration in this connection
is not the choosing of one inference against another. Credibility is not for the court. The thing
of importance is that an inference exculpating the
defendant from, guilt could also he reasonably
drawn from the evidence. That, of itself, is sufficient to prevent the application of res ipsa loquitur or the doctrine of exclusive control. As was
said in Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies, 337 Pa. 344,
345, 11 A. 2d 143, 144, "There being causes apparent, other than those within defendant's control, to which the accident might with equal fair-
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ness be attributed, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply." And, the same has been said
as to the inapplicability of the doctrine of exclusive control. Zahniser et al v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., Ltd., supra, 190 Pa. at page 353, 42 A.
707. See also Norris v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,
supra, 334 Pa. at page 165, 5 A. 2d 114, and Clark
v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 336 Pa. 75,
80, 6 A. 2d 892.
Finally, the Federal Court opinion had this to say with
respect to alleged breach of warranty:
The appellee argues on this appeal, apparently for the first time, that the judgment may be
sustained on the basis of a breach of warranty
by the defendant. Aside from no relation having
been shown to support a warranty by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, the case was pleaded,
tried and submitted on the ground of alleged negligence. The plaintiff having failed to sustain the
burden of proving negligence either directly or
circumstantially, the defendant was entitled to an
affirmance of its request for a directed verdict.
This court has had occasion to deal with faulty operation of fuse cases in the appeal of Buhler v. Maddison,
105 Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 933. We quote as follows:
*** Plaintiff continued to use the same fuse.
On July 2, 1941, he placed a charge of dynamite
in a hole in the tunnel to which he attached the
primer—a piece of fuse about 14 inches in length
with the cap attached. He lighted the fuse and he
and Kay then retired a safe distance and waited
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from 5 to 8 minutes for the charge to explode,
but hearing no explosion, he believed the fuse
had stopped burning before reaching the cap and
the dynamite. He entered the cross-cut which constituted the approach to the tunnel to pick up a
length of fuse to make a new primer, when the
charge exploded, hurling rocks and dirt, causing
facial injuries and the loss of his left eye, as well
as body bruises.

To recover under any theory of common law
negligence, the evidence must be sufficient to reasonably justify the jury in finding that defendant
was guilty of negligence which proximately caused
plaintiff's injuries, and that plaintiff was not
guilty of contributory negligence, and that he did
not assume the risk here involved. The only negligence alleged is that defendant furnished plaintiff
with defective fuse. Plaintiff concedes that he
discovered that the fuse had been wet and that it
was slow burning, when he first came to the Lone
Pine claims, and that he conducted experiments
which demonstrated that certain parts burned
more slowly than others; also that at times the
fuse burned out before the fire reached the charge,
although he had only 3 or 4 u missed holes" or
shots. However, in each case when a charge failed
to explode prior to the time of the accident, he
waited from 15 to 20 minutes before going into
the tunnel to set a new primer. He also admitted
he was aware of the safety regulations of both
Utah and Nevada which forbid going into a tunnel or other area where a charge has been set until
45 minutes after the time when it normally should
have exploded. In this case he waited only 5 to
8 minutes, and went into a place of known danger
where a substantial charge of dynamite had been
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connected with a fuse which he left burning. He
knew the fuse was defective in that there was delayed burning, and that in any event a state safety
regulation prohibited any approach of said danger
zone for 45 minutes. Even if the employer was
guilty of negligence in furnishing such slow-burning fuse, it would be unreasonable to find that
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence
under such circumstances. Thus, under the common law doctrince of negligence and contributory
negligence, plaintiff cannot recover.

Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Reeves, 95 F. 2d 190, is another fuse case. In holding that a directed verdict should
have been sustained for want of substantial testimony
for the plaintiff, the United States Court of Appeals
said:
The use of such fuse as is here in question
is to convey fire to the charge of explosive slowly
and in approximately measurable time, allowing
the workmen opportunity to retire to a safe distance. The fuse is not itself dangerous to life or
limb and one who manufactures and sells such
fuse is not an insurer of the product. Cf. Amason
v. Ford Motor Co., 5 Cir., 80 F. 2d 265. The law
requires him to use care in making it and inspecting it which is commensurate with the dangers involved in its intended use. Davlin v. Henry Ford
& Son, 6 Cir., 20 F. 2d 317; Dupont De Nemours
& Co. v. Baridon, 8 Cir., 73 F. 2d 26; Favo v. Remington Arms Co., 67 App. Div. 414, 73 N.Y.S. 788.
But absent any showing that his machinery, materials, designs or methods were faulty or that he
had failed to use proper care, he cannot be held
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liable for such an occurrence as the plaintiff has
described in his testimony. If it be assumed that
the plaintiff's testimony as to how the accident
happened was true, and if it be further assumed
that there was one very small piece out of the
many millions of feet of defendant's fuse which
had the defect of hanging fire for 15 minutes and
then conveying the spark to the powder charge,
such facts are not in themselves sufficient to convict defendant of actionable negligence toward
the plaintiff. The burden of proof was upon the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant was guilty
of some lack of due care, that it did something
or failed to do something which prudence forbade
or required and which was the proximate cause
of the injuries.

We think the cases cited are not applicable to
the facts in this case. Whether actionable negligence is shown must always depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. It must be determined from the peculiar facts whether taking
that view of the evidence most favorable to the
plaintiff it can be fairly inferred that the defendant has put out a dangerously defective article
as a result of the lack of due care on its part. In
the cases cited there was sufficient proof of negligence. Here such proof was lacking even if it be
assumed that a powder gap in the fuse was the
cause of a delayed explosion which injured the
plaintiff.
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3. Plaintiff was not denied opportunity to present
his contentions below.
It is simply not true, as appellant now suggests to
the court in his brief (pp. 6, 9, 10) that he was denied
the opportunity to raise a genuine issue of fact before
the court below.
Plaintiff's deposition was taken May 19, 1954 (R.
24-44). There was full opportunity to cross examine,
and plaintiff said the deposition told the story "fairly
and completely," to the best of his knowledge. (R. 40)
Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment supported by the Early affidavit and this deposition on June
7, 1954 (R. 8 to 13). Plaintiff filed his own affidavit on
June 17th (R. 15 to 17). Oral argument was held June
18, 1954 (R, 14). Plaintiff filed further affidavits August 21st (R. 20-22). Written briefs were submitted, and
the court made its decision October 1, 1954 (R. 45).
While plaintiff designated the entire record below
to be brought before this court (R. 47), there has been
omitted the oral argument and the briefs, from which
it would be painfully clear that counsel was permitted
every opportunity to present his contentions and to raise
any material issue of fact that might genuinely and
honestly exist.
However, the record before the court is nevertheless
clear on this point. Plaintiff cannot now assert that he
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was foreclosed from properly presenting his case below.
For the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment
it is obvious that ample opportunity was afforded him so
to do. The only issue properly before this court is the
legal question of whether the court committed error by
entering summary judgment on the state of the record
as the parties made it below in connection with defendant's motion.

Plaintiff's true position, and the drastic proposal
he is making to this court, is succinctly stated on pages
28 and 29 of his brief when he poses this question:
''Again, why should not the * * * manufacturer of explosives * * * be required to establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, his freedom from negligence?"

Among the many answers to this radical proposal are
these:
a. Plaintiff, entirely apart from any theory of
negligence, has already been compensated by his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the
injuries he incurred in the course of his employment.

b. Under the Anglo-American system of justice,
from time immemorial it has been left to the accuser to
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prove his charges. Why not also change to the Continental system of requiring the accused in a criminal
case to disprove charges against him I

c. Res Ipsa Loquitur is the common law doctrine
designed to assist a plaintiff in meeting his burden of
proof in circumstances where experience under the particular facts indicates both the probability of negligence
on the part of the defendant, and where defendant in control is in the position reasonably to assume the burden
of going forward with the evidence as to just what was
the cause of the accident, if indeed it was not due to his
own negligence. This doctrine with all its adaptability to
modern life in proper cases has been thought just and
fair to all concerned, by raising as a matter of law the
inference of defendant's negligence when plaintiff has
proceeded to establish the facts requisite to the creation
of such inference as a matter of law.

d. Such a radical departure from our system of
law as plaintiff suggests should at least come by legislative action rather than by judicial revolution.

e. As a practical matter the proposal amounts to a
rule of absolute liability. Properly presented with conflicting evidence, by and large the jury is still the best
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medium we know to sit and weigh out the truth. Plaintiff's proposal, however, in essence does not involve
determination of facts, but of liability, placing a premium
on appeal to the emotions.

At least absolute liability would avoid what amounts
to a speculative guess by the jury.
Also at this point we invite the court's attention to
the fact that the record below is silent in connection with
two matters which plaintiff's brief asserts were before
the court:
a.

On page 5 plaintiff states that "the plaintiff pre-

pared the caps himself and opened the original package
containing the dynamite and the powder caps and they
were both in the original packages, still sealed as they
came from the manufacturer."
h.

Counsel states that evidence would "show that

caps or dynamite manufactured in the usual manner and
standard could not be made to explode under the circumstances in this case. (Brief page 6)
This simply is not the record before the court below.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Since the evidence below was not in dispute, and the
facts in this case were not such as to bespeak of negligence on the part of defendant as the manufacturer of
the particular blasting cap and dynamite handled by
plaintiff, it is respectfully submitted that Summary
Judgment of no cause of action was properly made and
entered in this cause.

C. C. PARSONS,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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